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Rathgeb. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press/Cornell University Press, 2018. 234 pp. ISBN 9781501730580, 
$55 (hardcover).
DOI: 10.1177/0019793919898684
After two decades of bringing employers back in to comparative political economy, trade 
unions have all but disappeared from analysis of social policy development. Often a simple 
reference to declining trade union density seems enough to categorize them as irrelevant. In 
contrast to this general trend, Strong Governments, Precarious Workers argues that trade unions 
can still influence policy. Their influence, however, runs through more complex processes 
than is suggested by power resource theory, in which trade union density automatically acts as 
a power resource that promotes the interests of workers. Philip Rathgeb aims to make sense 
of that complexity by advancing an innovative and intriguing argument. Placing itself between 
producer group theory and partisanship theory, the book argues that trade union influence is 
dependent not only on trade union strength but also on the parliamentary situation.
The basic assumption is that decades of neoliberalism have made employer-friendly policy 
the default option for governments on both left and right. Strong governments, meaning 
governments with a coherent ideology and a solid parliamentary majority backing that ideol-
ogy, will therefore typically ignore trade unions. This approach limits trade unions’ capac-
ity to influence reforms in a direction that will not increase inequality or dualization. In 
that sense, strong governments tend to create precarious workers as the title indicates. By 
contrast, weak governments, who suffer either from internal ideological divisions or from 
lack of the parliamentary majority to have reforms adopted, often need extra-parliamentary 
legitimation to promote their reforms. In those situations, trade unions may gain influence 
on policy. In that sense, the argument suggests that although neoliberalism is the default 
option, trade unions can still gain influence and promote the interests of precarious workers.
To illustrate this argument, the book analyzes labor market reforms in Sweden, Denmark, 
and Austria. Selection of these three countries is based on the surprising observation that 
the supposedly strong and egalitarian Nordic trade unions have fared worse than their Aus-
trian counterparts in preventing dualization. For instance, Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) data on employment protection strictness are used to 
show that while Austria has experienced equalization between permanently and temporarily 
employed, Sweden and Denmark have experienced a strong decline in the protection of the 
temporarily employed. Similar patterns are found on other labor market policy issues that 
shape the divide between insiders and outsiders. For instance, the strong, active part of Swed-
ish and Danish labor market policy has been retrenched. How did Austrian unions manage to 
dampen dualization in the context of a Bismarckian welfare state, whereas the Nordic trade 
unions failed to do so in the context of a universalistic welfare state?
To answer this question, the book presents three detailed process-traced case studies of 
labor market reforms in the three countries. Each case study is framed by its own research 
question and delivers a thorough analysis of policy developments since the 1980s. In that way, 
the chapters have their own puzzles and draw on slightly dissimilar data, but they nonetheless 
feed into the common argument of the book. I found the developments surprisingly consis-
tent with Rathgeb’s argument about the implications of government strength on trade union 
influence. Strong Social Democratic governments in Denmark and Sweden have introduced 
reforms that increase dualization, whereas weaker conservative governments have involved 
trade unions to obtain legitimacy for their reforms. For instance, Swedish social democrats 
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have liberalized the use of fixed-term contracts, and Swedish and Danish social democrats 
have contributed to the hollowing out of the unemployment insurance systems.
These three case studies are supplemented with two shadow cases for illustrating differ-
ences in trade union orientation. The main argument of the book is that trade union influ-
ence is dependent on government strength, and a second issue is which kind of policies trade 
unions will pursue given that they gain influence. The book argues that the broad member-
ship base of Swedish, Danish, and Austrian unions orient them toward inclusive reforms that 
aim to prevent insider-outsider dualization. Drawing on secondary literature, the last chapter 
of the book presents data from Italy and Spain to suggest that less inclusive trade unions may 
use their influence to primarily protect insiders.
Although the book is well researched, well written, and thought provoking, it is not 
beyond criticism. Given that it covers policy developments in three countries over three-
and-a-half decades, clearly many empirical issues could have been discussed. My two main 
criticisms, however, focus on the basic building blocks of the theoretical argument. First, it 
is a bit unclear what makes a government strong or weak since both ideological coherence 
and parliamentary votes are taken into account. Take the post-crisis situation in Denmark. 
The Social Democratic, Socialist, and Social Liberal government is viewed as strong enough 
to ignore trade unions despite internal divisions on labor market reforms. The subsequent 
Liberal government is seen as weak, despite having a right-winged parliamentary majority 
behind it. It seems that in this case the number of votes a government controls determines 
government strength. Contrast this to the Austrian situation in which ideologically divided 
majority grand coalition governments are seen as too weak to bypass trade unions. Here it 
seems that ideological coherence determines government strength, not votes.
Second, although the analysis does show that left governments promote reforms that 
decrease worker protection or increase dualization, it is unclear why that is. Why has neo-
liberal reform become the default option, if that is indeed the case? Rather than pointing 
to a general neoliberal trend, scholars such as Stephanie Mudge (Leftism Reinvented: West-
ern Parties from Socialism to Neoliberalism, 2018) have pointed to the changing composition 
of the experts and leaders developing social democratic economic policy. Whereas these 
were previously economists recruited from trade union organizations, thus securing a strong 
focus on worker friendliness of policy, they have increasingly become academically trained 
economists orientated toward the state bureaucracy. In other words, the link between trade 
unions and left parties might matter. While the specific cause of left parties’ shift is not the 
focus of Rathgeb’s book, the issue does become relevant in his analysis. His book shows that 
the institutionalized position of Austrian trade unions within the Social Democratic Party of 
Austria (SPÖ) is an important mechanism for hampering the social democratic willingness to 
promote dualizing reforms (see pages 69 and 73). Where traditional power resource theory 
simply assumed a close relation between trade unions and social democracy, Rathgeb also 
emphasizes how this link has clearly diminished in the Nordic countries. This shift may be 
an important reason for the Social Democratic governments’ less worker-friendly reforms. 
Although the book focuses on trade union influence on specific reforms, I would suggest that 
the assumption about the default employer-friendliness of governments might be fruitfully 
replaced with a research question concerning the capacity of trade unions to influence the 
underlying ideological orientation of (especially) center-left governments.
Both of these issues, however, basically underline the relevance of studying the relation-
ship between trade unions and parliamentary politics. In this vein, Strong Governments, Pre-
carious Workers delivers a clear and intriguing argument that should stimulate debate and 
research in the years to come.
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